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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1995/300
13 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINA, FRANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to transmit to you the non-paper on the humanitarian impact of sanctions which has been agreed upon after consultations by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

We would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council for the information of its members and other States Members of the United Nations.

(Signed) LI Zhaoxing
Permanent Representative of
China to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations

(Signed) Sergey V. LAVROV
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation to
the United Nations

(Signed) David HANNAY
Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

(Signed) Madeleine Korbel ALBRIGHT
Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations

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Annex

Humanitarian impact of sanctions

The five permanent members emphasize the importance of the peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. While recognizing the need to maintain the effectiveness of sanctions imposed in accordance with the Charter, further collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regime should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries. The structure and implementation of future sanctions regimes may vary according to the resource base of the targeted country. The relevant considerations include:

- To assess objectively the short- and long-term humanitarian consequences of sanctions in the context of the overall sanctions regime. The more information the Security Council and sanctions committees have on the humanitarian situation at any stage in existing or potential target countries, the better. In this respect, a coordinating role for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs would be welcomed. The Department should draw on the expertise and assistance of States, agencies, appropriate international bodies and non-governmental organizations, and report to sanctions committees. The committees could draw on those reports in making operational decisions and when necessary refer matters beyond their competence to the Security Council for decision (for example, recommendations which would require changes to Security Council resolutions).

- In case of emergencies or force majeure situations, the Security Council and/or the sanctions committees may review the application of sanctions and take appropriate actions.

- In reviewing sanctions in the Security Council, to give due regard to the humanitarian situation.

- To envisage in the sanctions regimes provision for all States, including targeted States, to allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid. To elaborate measures aimed at discouraging the targeted States from impeding humanitarian aid and encouraging them to render their assistance in this respect.

- To ensure that procedures for consideration of humanitarian applications by sanctions committees are as expeditious as possible. The simplest possible authorization procedure should be developed in the case of essential humanitarian supplies - vital to the civilian population - with arrangements for monitoring by United Nations humanitarian agencies when it is necessary. Clearly defined categories of medical supplies and foodstuffs should be allowed to be supplied even without notification of relevant sanctions committees.

- To facilitate the expeditious process in the sanctions committees of applications from United Nations humanitarian agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- To pay particular attention to the improvement of the effectiveness of the sanctions committees by drawing on the experience and the work of different sanctions committees.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith the letter dated 13 April 1995 addressed to you by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mate Granić.

I would request your kind assistance in distributing the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 13 April 1995 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you of a serious deterioration of the security situation in the southern part of Croatia resulting from an unprovoked artillery attack aimed at the Dubrovnik Ćilipi airport. The Bosnian Serb paramilitary units fired a total of twenty-two 130-mm shells today from 1125 to 1300 local time. Twelve shells impacted on the grounds of the airport, and the others in the nearby villages of Radovčići and Močići. The aggressor utilized its artillery positions from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina east of Nevesinje, at Grab-Tuli. At 1700 local time one shell impacted in the town of Orašac near Zaton in Dubrovnik region, causing the death of one person and severe injuries to three more.

The aircraft fuel depot at the Dubrovnik airport, located 200 m from the terminal, was hit at 1240 and destroyed. The resulting fire has been brought under control.

I enclose a map of the Dubrovnik airport, with markings of the location and time of impacts within and in the vicinity of the perimeter of the airport. Dispersion of the impacts clearly shows that this attack was not at random, but that the new terminal building was directly targeted.

Further, I have to inform you that yesterday, 12 April 1995, Serb paramilitary forces in the occupied territories of Croatia in the vicinity of Slunj, in Zone Glina, launched an SA-6 surface-to-air missile that passed over the village of Donje Dubrave, and exploded on impact in the village of Malik, near Trošmarije, creating a 6-metre-wide impact crater.

The Republic of Croatia would like to emphasize the fact that these sophisticated Russian-produced missiles were not in the arsenal of the paramilitary forces in the occupied territories. We cannot but conclude that their transportation from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has been allowed, and that they are at present not under the control of the peace-keepers on the ground in accordance with the Zagreb Agreement. It is further clear that the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not sealed, which should be taken into account in the upcoming consideration of resolution 970 (1995).

In respect of the above, the Government of the Republic of Croatia finds it absolutely necessary that the Security Council consider this issue in a statement. Croatia has so far not responded to the attacks that certainly surpass the level of everyday provocations and, in case they should be repeated, the Croatian Army shall be compelled to take all necessary defensive measures in this regard.

Furthermore, this development may be detrimental to the peace process in general, in particular at this sensitive junction of deployment of the new peace-keeping force to the Republic of Croatia.

(Signed) Mate Granić
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure



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S/1995/302
13 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached report which was addressed to me on 11 April 1995 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This report by the Co-Chairmen contains the certification referred to in Security Council resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Operations of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This additional report is submitted as indicated in paragraph 36 of the annex to the letter dated 31 March 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/255).

2. It will be recalled that on 4 August 1994 the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day:

(a) "To break off political and economic relations with the 'Republika Srpska'";

(b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the 'Republika Srpska' (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia";

(c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the 'Republika Srpska' except food, clothing and medicine".

3. In its resolution 970 (1995), adopted on 12 January 1995, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General submit every 30 days for its review a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Pursuant to paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council reports from the Co-Chairmen on the state of implementation of the above-mentioned measures on 3 February (S/1995/104), 2 March (S/1995/175) and 31 March (S/1995/255). The report dated 31 March 1995 contained the following certification from the Co-Chairmen:

> "In light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, and based on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or national technical means, and aside from the reported tracking of helicopters crossing the border, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the land border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the past 30 days there were no commercial

transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

4. Security Council resolution 970 (1995) provides that the restrictions and other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994 shall be suspended for a further period of 100 days from the adoption of resolution 970 (1995). The present report supplements the three previous 30-day reports and discusses developments during the first 10 days of April.

II. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS ON THE BORDER CLOSURE

5. The legislation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) closing the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces continues to be in force.

6. The Mission has received from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the following analysis of confiscations along the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina for March 1995:

Petrol	10.4 tons
Diesel	114.7 tons
Motor oil	194 litres
Cigarettes	2.4 tons
Construction materials	3.8 tons
Wood	10 cubic metres
Alcohol	nil
Food	9.9 tons
Textiles/clothing/footwear	490 kg
Motor vehicles	5
Coffee	82 kg
Other goods	22.2 tons

There were 84 customs offence procedures initiated during the month and 72 were finalized. Fines and penalties amounted to 251,400 dinars. The confiscations of diesel fuel included one large consignment of 100 tons in Sector Charlie on 18 March. Apart from alcohol most of the other categories of confiscations show an increase over the previous month. While the number of new offence cases initiated is down from the previous month they are above the average of the previous seven months, and there is a monthly increase in the number of cases finalized as well as in the value of penalties.

III. ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND WORK OF THE MISSION

7. As at 10 April 1995, 152 international Mission personnel were on duty with the Mission. The Mission personnel to date have come from the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. Because of financial difficulties, no new observers have been taken on to replace those who leave. The participating countries have been asked to replace any observers who depart the Mission after 15 April on a one-for-one basis. By the Mission's own calculations, an observer complement below 150 may not be able to provide sufficiently credible information to certify whether the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is in compliance with its decision to close its border with Bosnian Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina to all but shipments of humanitarian aid. Depending on the receipt of funding the Mission will determine at the earliest possible date if and when it will request observers above the 150 minimum.

8. Around the end of March an unusually heavy snowfall was experienced in the mountainous regions of the area of operations. The snow caused roadblocks and multiple avalanches, thus impeding most mobile patrols and preventing the relief of teams at several border crossing-points. The team from the Sula border crossing-point was withdrawn on 30 March at 1430 because of the blizzard. Sula was remanned again on 31 March at 1530. The observers at the Sastavci border crossing-point were stranded for 102 hours before they were relieved on 2 April. From 31 March to late on 1 April it was not possible to relieve teams at Scepan Polje and Krstac.

IV. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE MISSION

9. The Mission continues to enjoy full freedom of movement within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

10. On 6 April, four kilometres north of Uvac near a pedestrian bridge over the river ford (Sector Bravo), a mobile patrol, led by the Head of Sector, received incoming rifle fire (about 10 rounds went into the water some 20 metres below the vehicle and 5 to 6 rounds impacted 5-6 metres above the car). The gunfire came from a Bosnian civilian, who is living on the other side of the bridge. On the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) side there were three policemen, one customs official and two Yugoslav Army soldiers on the spot, but they did not react in any way. The patrol had to withdraw from the scene and the next day the Head of Sector submitted a strong protest to the local authorities (Yugoslav Army, militia). They regretted the incident very much and apologized for their personnel's reaction. They assured the Head of Sector that a Yugoslav Army liaison officer will always be present with Mission patrols in this area to look after their security. On the same day the Mission Coordinator called the Director of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) who expressed his deep concern and promised to take necessary measures immediately to defuse the situation. Nevertheless, the Mission

Coordinator instructed Sector Bravo not to approach the place until security was fully restored.

11. On 8 April, the Mission teams working in Belgrade port (Sector Belgrade) were subjected to threats from angry drivers. Security was inadequate and they had to withdraw to the hotel with a police escort.

V. COOPERATION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) WITH THE MISSION

12. Cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be good.

13. With reference to the Mission's previous monthly reports it should be noted that:

(a) Violations cited in those reports are in most cases isolated exceptions, and need to be read in the context of overall satisfactory compliance by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Swift disciplinary measures taken by the authorities against deficient police or customs officials suggest that the violations are errors (wilful or accidental) on the part of individual officers acting against government policy;

(b) Smuggling attempts can be expected along any frontier which has restricted passage. The authorities have reacted quickly and have taken action against individuals involved in smuggling attempts. The Mission has no evidence to suggest that unauthorized goods cross the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina in any appreciable quantity;

(c) It can be expected that locals in isolated areas may tamper with border barricades which cause them inconvenience. They may do it for freedom of movement or for purposes of smuggling but the authorities react quickly to rebuild, restore or repair the barricades. In most cases these uncontrolled border crossings are in very remote locations where the difficult terrain would make truck crossings very difficult or virtually impossible.

14. Since agreeing to a new Memorandum of Understanding on Yugoslav Red Cross consignments, inspection facilities for their loads are now more or less in line with the other international aid agencies, making it even more difficult to conceal any significant quantity of contraband. It is worth noting as well that the Customs authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regularly receive inquiries and requests mainly about definitions of humanitarian aid goods allowed to cross the border. Normally the authorities will deal with these matters themselves, but in case of doubt will consult the Mission. During the period from 1 to 31 March the Customs received 63 requests and rejected all of them. They consulted the Mission on another 15 cases of which 10 were approved and 5 were disallowed. The Mission Coordinator has stressed that the Mission exercises the right to refuse to seal any vehicle when its monitors are not satisfied with the cargo or the searching procedure.

VI. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES

15. The operating principle of the Mission is to base its reporting and evaluations on its own observations and on information that it has verified. The Mission Coordinator has maintained a standing request to Governments possessing the technical capacity to provide it with information relevant to its mandate.

16. On 2 April, the Mission received information from an unknown source that the Bosnian Serb Army had acquired a substantial resupply of ammunition or other war matériel across the border, carried in civilian trucks which normally carry humanitarian aid. It was alleged that about 30 humanitarian aid trucks crossed the border at border crossing-point Sremska Raca (Sector Belgrade) on 30 March and 46 trucks on 31 March, all without proper checks. It was further alleged that this information was corroborated from independent sources. The Mission has checked this matter thoroughly and can confirm that, because of the inspection and loading procedures in place with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as from standard customs inspections of trucks which arrive at Belgrade port already loaded, it is virtually impossible to conceal any significant quantity of ammunition or other war matériel in their consignments. The Mission has also carefully reviewed procedures regarding Yugoslav Red Cross consignments on the two days in question and has questioned the monitors who were working at Belgrade port and Novi Sad (two principal points for loading, inspecting and sealing). It was confirmed that they had been present during all customs inspections and that the Customs had diligently searched and inspected all the trucks either by using a probe (feeler) or by moving some of the cargo at random.

17. In this regard, it may be noted that in the whole history of the Mission there have been no discoveries of weapons, ammunition or anything similar, apart from one instance at the end of February (Sector Charlie) when one man was apprehended by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Customs while attempting to cross the border with a gun, one hand grenade and some ammunition.

VII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE AUTHORITIES

18. On 2 April, a mobile patrol observed a number of boats on the Bosnian side of the Drina River near Culine, 10 km south of Mali Zvornik (Sector Alpha). A special militia patrol was notified. Close monitoring of this site was continued, and on 5 April another mobile patrol, taking a high ground observation post, was able to observe on the Bosnian side across Culine what appeared to be a Bosnian Serb fuel supply depot, including 1 military fuel tanker, 4 military trucks, 3 rubber boats (approximate capacity 12 pax), 2 barges, 2 big metal reservoirs and a number of metal containers on the island in the middle of the river. On 6 April, another mobile patrol confirmed the finding and notified the local authorities. Since then, a special militia team of police and army has established a 24-hour surveillance on the place. The Mission mobile patrols continue to monitor this site closely.

19. On 2 April, a Sula border crossing-point team (Sector Bravo) reported that a truck with one uniformed policeman of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), previously rejected, was allowed to cross to the Bosnian side of the border. The local police commander, presented with a protest, confirmed that it was a mistake by his personnel.

20. On 2 April, at Strpci Station (Sector Bajina Basta) a Mission team encountered an individual with a submachine gun who presented himself as a driver for a military commanding officer from the Bosnian Serb side and warned team members not to use binoculars or cameras trained at the Bosnian side, saying: "We do not want to shoot at you". The authorities were notified about this individual, along with the fact that the team had not used any cameras.

21. On 3 April, at Drzavna Ada, 3 km south of Badovinci (Sector Alpha) a large boat was spotted on the Bosnian side of the river Drina by a mobile patrol, as well as a Yugoslav Army ambush on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) side waiting in case it came across.

22. On 5 April, the Head of Sector Bravo together with a local police chief and a Yugoslav Army liaison officer visited the FAP truck factory near Priboj and witnessed truck frames in production. They found no evidence of military production.

23. On 5 April, a mobile patrol discovered a new possible point for potential smuggling at a disused railroad line across the boundary in the vicinity of Vracenovici (Sector Charlie). Two empty trucks were observed there on rendezvous with another car, entering the Bosnian side and heading to Bileca. The police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were notified, as was the Yugoslav Army liaison officer. Discussions about the modalities of coverage of this point are still in progress.

24. On 7 April, a mobile patrol near Jamena (Sector Belgrade) observed three new pontoons tied together plus one tug boat on the Bosnian side. Three military personnel were seen as well, busily servicing the tug boat. Nevertheless, there were no traces of activity on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) side: the seals on the barriers were intact. The police and Yugoslav Army seemed unaware of what the Bosnian Serb side was doing.

25. On 7 April, at Badovinci (Sector Alpha) it was reported that under the bridge the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) captured nine men and three women on bicycles who were trying to smuggle to Bosnia and Herzegovina approximately 1.2 tons of fuel, which was confiscated on the spot.

26. On 8 April, near Citluc (Sector Alpha) the Commanding Officer of a special militia team notified a mobile patrol that there was a potential smuggling site on the Bosnian side where a large barge capable of carrying a loaded truck had been spotted. The place is being closely monitored by mobile patrols.

27. On 8 April, from Vilusi (Sector Charlie) the observers reported that they had observed one truck with approximately 50 to 60 crates of empty beer bottles crossing into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at night without being checked. In two hours the same truck, already with full bottles, crossed back into Bosnia and Herzegovina without being checked again. On 9 April, the matter was reported to the local authorities for appropriate action.

28. During the period from 2 to 7 April, United Nations airfield monitors working at radar screens at Surcin Airport near Belgrade observed an additional 25 unexplained slow-moving radar contacts from Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). As in March, none was observed by Mission personnel from the ground even though additional mobile patrols were mounted to search the skies during likely hours of crossing in the most travelled reaches of the Drina (between Mali Zvornik and Ljubovija). As in the past, there were no reports of likely helicopter flights travelling from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) back into Bosnia and Herzegovina. When presented with this information on 10 April, the Customs Director of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mihalj Kertes, confirmed only the crossing, and return, of a helicopter from Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 5 April and one on 6 April, but denied the existence of the other 23 possible helicopter flights.

29. At a later meeting, on 10 April, the Mission Coordinator, together with his Senior Political Adviser and Press Officer, met with the Director of Customs, the Deputy Director of Customs, the Assistant to the Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff for Air Force, the Assistant to the Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff for Radars and Electronic Monitoring Systems, the Yugoslav Army Head of Regional Flight Control and the Deputy Director of Civilian Air-traffic Control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). At the meeting the authorities categorically denied any involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the alleged air crossings. In view of the countervailing claims by senior officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as to the veracity of UNPROFOR technical data, it was agreed that experts should be asked to review the radar tapes for the period from 2 to 7 April. Since the Mission does not have the necessary technical expertise to accomplish this, and because there is sufficient reason to defer judgement on possible violations of the air border, the Mission Coordinator concurred, and will convey this request to the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters.

30. Some 80 radar contacts have been reported by UNPROFOR to the Mission since 19 October 1994. Each track has been plotted to show its point of detection, the point of border crossing and the place where the radar track faded. Analysis of the positions and timing of these events shows no apparent pattern. Despite the recent extraordinary efforts by Mission personnel to confirm visually these possible violations of the air border, not one helicopter has been sighted from the ground. None the less, the characteristics of these radar contacts are, according to United Nations military observers, indicative of helicopters.

VIII. CERTIFICATION

31. In the light of the foregoing developments based on the Mission's on-site observation, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of NATO or national technical means, and aside from the reported tracking of possible helicopters crossing the border, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the land border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the period covered by this report there have been no commercial transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the text of a statement dated 9 April 1995 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning the exacerbation of the situation on the Afghan-Tajik border (see annex).

I request you to have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

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Annex

Statement dated 9 April 1995 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

In recent days the attacks by Tajik opposition fighters against the Russian border guards who are guarding the Tajik-Afghan border in accordance with bilateral Russian-Tajik agreements and multilateral agreements concluded by the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States have increased in frequency and have become particularly audacious and provocative.

Thus, following the shelling of a column of border guards in the Kalaikhumb sector, on the subject of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made a statement on 7 April 1995, further shellings and attacks have taken place in April, causing casualties among the Russian, Kazakh and Tajik border troops.

These armed actions constitute a gross and blatant violation by the Tajik opposition of the provisions of the Agreement on a Temporary Cease-Fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts, which was concluded between it and the Republic of Tajikistan on 17 September 1994. The actions were carried out at a time when - as became clear during the contacts which representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had on 4 and 5 April in Moscow with Mr. A. Turajonzodah, the head of the opposition delegation, and Mr. R. Píriz Ballón, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tajikistan - the preparations for the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks have entered the phase of the adoption of final decisions and the possibility has emerged of holding the talks in Moscow in the near future. Apparently, after considering the results of the contacts, the opposition leaders came to the conclusion that they would not be able to continue to avoid a statement on a significant extension of the cease-fire, which United Nations representatives, the observer States in the inter-Tajik negotiating process and other countries concerned are urging them to make, by resorting to delaying tactics, unfounded accusations against the Russian border guards and an escalation of the demands that they are putting forward as conditions for an agreement to return to the negotiating table.

To all appearances, the plans of the opposition ruling clique involve unleashing wide-scale armed actions during the spring and summer period and it is difficult for it to abandon those plans for the sake of an intensive search for political compromises.

It is evident that the opposition's hopes of achieving its goals through confrontation by force are short-sighted and doomed to failure. Military provocations can only lead to a breakdown of the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks and complicate the dialogue aimed at achieving national agreement and reconciliation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation calls upon the Tajik opposition leaders to stop their dangerous provocations immediately, go to the negotiating table with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and conduct the negotiations in a constructive spirit. As an

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observer State, Russia is prepared to provide all necessary assistance to the inter-Tajik negotiating process.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation strongly protests to the central and local authorities of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, with whose evident connivance Tajik opposition fighters made attacks against Russian border guards from Afghan territory. The special characteristics of the internal political situation in Afghanistan do not release either the Kabul Government or the military and political groupings which control districts in which Tajik opposition detachments are operating from responsibility for provocations in the border areas.

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S/1995/304
14 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THIRD REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SECURITY IN THE RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 10 February 1995 (S/PRST/1995/7), which followed the Council's consideration of my second report, dated 25 January, on security in the Rwandese refugee camps (S/1995/65) and my letter of 1 February (S/1995/127). In paragraph 7 of that statement, the Council requested me to continue my exploration of options and to make further recommendations necessary for ensuring security in the camps. It also requested me to submit a further report on this subject in the light of the outcome of the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, hosted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Bujumbura.

2. In my report of 25 January (S/1995/65), I informed the Council of my consultations with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, regarding security in the refugee camps, especially those in Zaire. It was then decided that UNHCR would follow up with the Government of Zaire on the latter's earlier discussions with my Special Representative for Rwanda with a view to concluding appropriate arrangements, under UNHCR's mandate for refugee protection and humanitarian assistance, to enhance security in the camps.

3. On 27 January 1995, an aide-mémoire was signed between the Government of Zaire and UNHCR outlining specific measures to improve security in the camps in Zaire. Under the agreement, the Government of Zaire was to deploy a contingent of 1,500 military and police personnel - the Zairian Camp Security Contingent - to provide security in the camps, including measures to prevent violence, escort repatriation convoys, maintain law and order and control the crowds at food distribution sites.

4. In early February 1995, the first group of 100 personnel of the Zairian Camp Security Contingent arrived in Goma. As of 11 April, the Contingent stood at 913 troops operating in Kibumba, Katale/Kahindo and Mugumba/Lac Vert. Deployment sites are being prepared in south Kivu and are expected to be ready

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by the end of the month. UNHCR has assessed the performance of the Contingent as very satisfactory and cooperative.

5. In addition to the Zairian Contingent, UNHCR requested Governments to provide 35 to 60 international experts to serve in the Civilian Security Liaison Group. On 24 February, an advance group of 12 experts from the Netherlands arrived in Goma, where a total of 16 Netherlands experts have been deployed to date. The Government of Switzerland has provided one expert and the Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso and Cameroon have each offered to provide between 10 and 20 experts to serve in the Liaison Group. UNHCR also requested the Department of Peace-keeping Operations to select a senior military officer to serve as the Commander of the Liaison Group, under the authority of the UNHCR civilian official who is heading the Group. On the recommendation of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, UNHCR appointed Brigadier-General (retired) Ian Douglas of Canada, who has served in several peace-keeping operations. General Douglas took up his duties in Goma on 27 March 1995. The total cost of the security operation in Zaire, through the end of June, is estimated at $9.7 million.

II. PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS

A. Refugees in Burundi

6. In early April 1995, there were 240,000 refugees in Burundi, mostly from southern Rwanda. The deteriorating security situation in Burundi has affected the refugees inside and outside the camps. In the northern part of the country, where all seven refugee camps are located, there are constant movements of refugees fleeing to and from neighbouring countries at great risk to themselves. The strict border control by the army and the presence of uncontrolled armed groups in border areas have resulted in acts of violence, which have claimed several lives outside the camps. Although the refugee camps are guarded by the army and movements of refugees are restricted, incidents have also taken place inside the camps.

7. In view of the general insecurity in recent weeks, several thousand Rwandese refugees and a large number of Burundians have left Burundi for the United Republic of Tanzania. Between 17 February and 10 March, 16,000 Burundians and 8,000 Rwandese arrived in the United Republic of Tanzania from Burundi as refugees. In the last days of March, violence in Bujumbura unleashed a new exodus of refugees and sparked an outflow of 24,000 persons into Zaire. During the same period, some 70,000 Rwandese refugees left camps in northern Burundi for the United Republic of Tanzania; several thousand had slipped across the border before it was ordered closed by the Tanzanian Government. As of 5 April, 15,000 had been trucked back to two camps; the rest are scattered at various sites in northern Burundi.

B. Refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania

8. As of 26 March 1995, 600,000 refugees were in camps in the United Republic of Tanzania. The security situation in these camps remained relatively stable during the first two months of this year. In February, a joint UNHCR/United Republic of Tanzania/Netherlands mission made an assessment of the security requirements for the camps and estimated the total cost at $3 million. It recommended an increase of police personnel by 90, bringing the total to 400; an improvement in transport and logistics capacity; and arrangements for the maintenance of security in the camps.

9. In February, Tanzanian police escorted 200 returnees under tight security from the Benaco camp to the border town of Rusumo. Incidents within the camps, mainly of a criminal nature, against aid workers, the local population and the police increased in March and registration for repatriation virtually stopped.

C. Refugees in Zaire

10. In early April, there were 1.1 million refugees in the camps in Zaire. The immediate effect of the deployment of the security forces (the Zairian Camp Security Contingent and the Civilian Security Liaison Group) was to facilitate organized repatriation. The number of refugees departing from the Goma camps rose from 2,000 in January 1995 to 10,000 a month later. Repatriation declined substantially in March, however, partly as a result of reports reaching the refugees about increased arrests and detentions inside Rwanda.

11. Further contributing to that decline was the reduction of rations in the camps, necessitated by overall shortages of relevant food items in the region, although it was perceived by the refugees as a deliberate measure to force their repatriation. On 31 March, the food situation in the Goma camps was described by the World Food Programme (WFP) as critical. Surveys indicated that malnutrition in these camps was increasing. Acute food shortages continue, but positive changes are expected by UNHCR in the coming weeks following a regional meeting on logistics in Nairobi. The militia of the former Rwandese Government are exploiting the food shortage to incite the refugee population and reinforce their campaign against repatriation.

III. REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

12. The OAU/UNHCR Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region took place from 15 to 17 February 1995 in Bujumbura. It adopted a plan of action with a primary focus on voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution to the refugee problem. To achieve that goal, it underscored the roles to be played by the countries of origin, the countries of asylum and the international community. It also outlined specific measures to be taken in that regard.

13. In my message to the Conference, I stressed that there were both short-term and long-term solutions to the refugee problem. Security in the camps and

eradication of intimidation and blackmail of refugees are among the short-term measures. I stated further that solving the refugee problem in the long term would require the combined efforts of African Governments and the international community with the full involvement of the civil society.

14. Among other short-term actions, the Conference urged the earliest possible implementation of the Zaire/UNHCR agreement of 27 January 1995, which is now being successfully implemented. The Conference expressed the hope that a broader United Nations conference on peace, security and stability, as called for by the Security Council, would soon be held. Consultations on the holding of such a conference are continuing.

15. In addition, the Conference recognized that the problem of refugees, returnees and displaced persons was a global responsibility and it emphasized the need for equitable burden-sharing, taking into consideration that the asylum countries and the countries of origin are among the least developed. The international community was therefore urged to assist them through the adoption of concrete measures aimed at alleviating and redressing the negative impact on the local communities directly caused by the presence of refugees and displaced persons. To this end, the Conference requested the United Nations Development Programme to convene a round-table meeting of donors on the countries of the region, in order to coordinate the actions to be undertaken. Active preparations for such a meeting are already under way.

16. I am concerned that recent developments, such as the closure of borders and attacks on refugee camps, are in blatant disregard of the agreement reached in Bujumbura. I believe that the early implementation of some of the key recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference will contribute to resolving the refugee problem in the region. I appeal to all States to act in accordance with those recommendations.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

17. At the beginning of the month, UNHCR warned that only half of the food needs of the Rwandese refugees were available for distribution in April. The reduction of rations has led to the beginnings of malnutrition among women and children, as well as to the belief on the part of refugees that the international community is using food as a weapon to force them to return to their country.

18. The deteriorating food situation in the camps is a sign of serious fatigue on the part of donors faced with an increasing number of refugees and displaced persons around the world. I appeal to donor nations to reverse this situation so as not to worsen the plight of these refugees.

19. Both the Government of Rwanda and the international community are seriously concerned by persistent reports about arms shipments into Goma airport, allegedly for arming the former Rwandese government forces, as well as about the training of these forces on Zairian territory. These allegations have been rejected by the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations in a communication transmitted to the Security Council on

6 April 1995. During the Bujumbura Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire requested that an independent commission of inquiry be established to investigate and report on the matter. I therefore intend to hold consultations with the Governments of the countries concerned, as well as with OAU, on measures to respond to that request.

20. The deployment of the Zairian Camp Security Contingent and the Civilian Security Liaison Group in the refugee camps has so far proved to have had a positive effect. It is hoped that full deployment of the Zairian Contingent will further improve security conditions. Although this is strictly speaking beyond its mandate, its presence may also help in preventing unfortunate incidents such as the one that occurred on 11 April 1995, when unidentified men attacked the Birava camp, where the Zairian Contingent was about to be deployed. A total of 31 Rwandese refugees were killed in that attack.

21. However, the improvement of security conditions in the camps is not enough to ensure the voluntary repatriation of all the refugees. Ultimately, voluntary repatriation will depend on the efforts of the Government of Rwanda to promote genuine national reconciliation among all segments of Rwandese society and to ensure that refugees can return to their communities without fear of persecution. In that regard, I should like to stress once again that, in order to achieve that goal, more rapid and effective assistance from the international community is required.

22. Reports about numerous arrests and the overcrowded prisons in Rwanda have raised fears among the refugees and hindered the process of voluntary repatriation. This has resulted in the decline in the number of returnees from 200 persons a week to 200 a month.

23. Rebuilding the Rwandese justice system remains an important factor in contributing to the creation of conditions conducive to the return of refugees, and efforts by the Government of Rwanda in that direction should be supported. The international community has already pledged $618 million to support the Government's rehabilitation and reconstruction programme, including rebuilding the justice system. Most of these pledges, however, have not yet been translated into actual assistance. Meanwhile, most of the contributions to the Trust Fund for Rwanda, amounting to $4,710,857 as at 1 April, are being disbursed to support the Rwandese justice system.

24. In its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February, the Security Council urged Member States to arrest and detain persons found within their territory against whom there was sufficient evidence of responsibility for acts within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. Implementation of that resolution by Member States will also enhance the process of national reconciliation and an early return of the refugees.

25. Only the combined efforts of the countries of origin, the countries of asylum and the international community can achieve the enormous task of ensuring that all the refugees and the displaced persons in the Great Lakes region voluntarily return to their homes and communities. I appeal to all Member States to take the actions that are so urgently required.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 975 (1995) of 30 January 1995, by which the Council requested me to submit a progress report on the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) by 15 April 1995. As required, it apprises the Council of the modalities of the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH.

2. It will be recalled that in resolution 975 (1995), the Security Council authorized me to recruit and deploy military contingents, civilian police and other civilian personnel sufficient to allow UNMIH to assume the full range of its functions as established by resolution 867 (1993) and as revised and extended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 940 (1994). The Council further authorized me, in coordination with the Commander of the multinational force, to take the necessary steps in order for UNMIH to assume these responsibilities as soon as possible, with full transfer of responsibilities from the multinational force to UNMIH to be completed by 31 March 1995.

3. On 31 March 1995, the official ceremony of transfer of responsibilities from the multinational force to UNMIH took place at the National Palace at Port-au-Prince. It was attended, inter alia, by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti, President William J. Clinton of the United States of America, the President of the Security Council and myself. The spirit on this occasion highlighted the excellent working relations existing between the multinational force and UNMIH, in particular the effective cooperation between the United States authorities and the United Nations.

4. My short visit to Haiti on this occasion gave me a good opportunity to observe the beginning of the operation of UNMIH and to exchange views with the President of Haiti on the political situation in the country, on security-related matters, on the efforts to rehabilitate the economy and on the process of national reconciliation. Discussions with my Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Commander of the military component of UNMIH, Major-General Joseph Kinzer, and the Commander of the civilian police component of UNMIH, Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot, confirmed that the environment

prevailing in the country with respect to security and stability was such as to allow for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH in accordance with Security Council resolutions 940 (1994) and 975 (1995).

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

5. As UNMIH begins to discharge its duties more than five months after the return of President Aristide, the situation in Haiti is different from the one in September 1994 when the multinational force was deployed. The presence of the multinational force has brought more stable conditions and restored reasonable normality to the life of the population. The present political situation is characterized by wide popular support for President Aristide and few human rights violations. At the same time, there are major institutional weaknesses and growing - and potentially worrying - frustrations over the slow pace of economic recovery.

6. Haiti has been without a Parliament since 4 February 1995, when the mandates of all the members of the Chamber of Deputies and two thirds of the Senators expired. A presidential order of 25 February 1995 authorized the Minister of the Interior to extend the mandate of elected officials at the local level or to replace them with new interim officials.

7. As regards the judiciary, a number of judges, as well as the Chief Prosecutor in Port-au-Prince, have been replaced. The Minister of Justice recently announced an increase in the salaries of judicial personnel in order to encourage them to improve their performance. A National Commission for Truth and Justice was inaugurated in my presence on 30 March 1995. It is responsible for investigating human rights violations committed under the military authorities after the military coup d'état of September 1991.

8. A new Minister of the Interior, Mr. M. Beaubrun, was appointed on 23 February 1995. Subsequently, the Minister was alleged to have been involved in the assassination on 28 March of Mme. M. Durocher-Bertin, a well-known lawyer and prominent critic of President Aristide. These allegations, which have been widely reported by the Haitian and international press, are being investigated, at the request of President Aristide, with the assistance of United States specialists. The Government announced on 6 April 1995 the creation of a commission of five interim police officers to investigate recent murders, including that of Mme. Durocher-Bertin. Investigations will also be re-opened on murders committed under the military regime, such as the assassinations of President Aristide's aide Antoine Izmery, former Justice Minister Guy Malary and Father Jean-Marie Vincent. Furthermore, the Government has launched a mobilization campaign called "justice for all", which aims at encouraging the population to testify in court in cases of assassination of Haitian citizens.

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

9. The political changes have created high expectations for swift economic recovery. During my recent visit, I again noted the tremendous economic challenges that persist in Haiti. The extreme poverty and high unemployment

prevailing in much of the country require sustained international attention. Private and public investments are urgently needed to stimulate the economy, which suffers from a lack of basic infrastructure and high unemployment. Electricity shortages continue to be a hindrance to industrial revival.

10. It will be recalled that the meeting of multilateral agencies and donors held in Paris in January 1995 resulted in commitments of close to US$ 900 million for an aid and reconstruction package for Haiti over the next 12 to 18 months. Although such commitments reflect the confidence of the international community in the future of Haiti, the country's absorptive capacity continues to be quite modest. Only scattered evidence exists on the evolution of the economy. Recovery signals are still weak, inflation is comparatively high and unemployment remains a major economic, social and political problem.

11. The Haitian public expected that the return of President Aristide would bring a rapid improvement of their standard of living. This is unlikely to happen any time soon, and it is symptomatic that the Government was recently criticized during small-scale popular demonstrations in Cap Haïtien and Port-au-Prince and that its members have been blamed for unemployment and the high cost of living. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming elections will encourage international investors to pay more attention to the country's long-term development needs. However, perceptions of the public security situation seem at present to be impeding foreign investment.

IV. SECURITY SITUATION

12. The issue of security is central to the entire United Nations operation in Haiti. The decision of the Security Council to deploy UNMIH rested on the assumption that in the context of resolution 975 (1995), the Haitian authorities would be capable of maintaining a secure environment, with the assistance of UNMIH. However, while very few human rights violations have been reported during the last two months, crime remains at a high level by Haitian standards and a sense of insecurity prevails.

13. During my meetings with President Aristide on 30 and 31 March, I reiterated the importance of enabling the interim Haitian police to enforce law and order, in which task they would be assisted by the UNMIH civilian police (CIVPOL). Unfortunately, their capacity still remains highly questionable. A functioning police force will be particularly important at the time of the elections, which could be negatively affected by a lack of adequate law enforcement. In addition, it is clear that the absence of effective policing will permit a further rise in common crime.

14. The beginning of March was marked by a significant increase in crime, including numerous murders in Port-au-Prince which were directly attributable to the activities of vigilante elements. However, such activities have declined in recent weeks. There were 3 reported "vigilante killings" during the period from 4 to 11 April, compared to approximately 10 during the period from 17 to 31 March and 26 during the period from 10 to 16 March. Efforts to educate the population on the law and the rights of citizens through public information

campaigns will be intensified, especially as regards the legal consequences of vigilante actions.

15. The violence, together with the shortcomings of the Interim Public Security Force, have led to concern that UNMIH, operating without enforcement authority, will not prove as effective as the multinational force, whose mandate included enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. This concern is echoed in certain sectors of the Haitian population. There are also indications that disruptive elements might try to test the resolve of UNMIH to fulfil its mandate, although at present there is no confirmed threat to UNMIH. Overall, it is anticipated that the level of direct threat to UNMIH will remain low, but the possibility of incidents during routine operations should not be underestimated.

16. My Special Representative and the Commanders of the military and CIVPOL components of UNMIH are prepared to meet these challenges. The Force Commander has received assertive rules of engagement and the CIVPOL Commander has received proactive operation guidelines. Effective coordination has been established between contingents with respect to security preparations, and it is possible to be reasonably confident that they will be able to cope with the problems that may arise.

V. HAITIAN POLICE

17. On 3 February 1995, President Aristide inaugurated a new Police Academy, and a first group of 375 cadets started a four-month training programme. A second group of 375 trainees began their studies on 13 March.

18. Discussions are taking place within the Government and between the Government and UNMIH on the best procedure for moving forward from the present unsatisfactory situation to the full deployment of a functional National Police able to carry out its duties effectively. Because of its continuing bilateral programme for the formation of the National Police at the Police Academy, the Government of the United States is taking part in these discussions.

19. When the first class of Academy graduates is ready to be deployed in June 1995, the National Police will still be a long way from the minimum of 7,000 police agents needed to keep law and order in the country. Members of the Interim Public Security Force, who number fewer than 3,000, will therefore still be needed and will have to be encouraged and motivated to do their work. At the present time, they remain unmotivated and many are regarded as lacking basic police skills. They have yet to receive vehicles and communications and other basic equipment. Delays in the payment of their salaries are contributing to low morale, as are uncertainties about their future.

20. Proposals presented by the joint United Nations/United States working committee on the Haitian police for the future of the Interim Public Security Force have not yet been accepted by the Haitian authorities, and there are indications that the Force could be demobilized as soon as cadets of the new National Police start to graduate from the Academy. At this time, there are no programmes in place to absorb members of the Interim Public Security Force in

alternative civilian employment. This is likely to undermine further their morale and their willingness to continue to serve in the Force, at a time when it is critically needed.

21. It will be recalled that pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 975 (1995) a United Nations fund was established to enable Member States to make voluntary contributions to support the international police monitoring programme and assist with the creation of an adequate police force in Haiti. On 24 March 1995, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations informed me that his Government had decided to contribute US$ 3 million to this fund. I encourage other Governments to consider supporting this crucial aspect of Haitian institution-building by contributing to the fund.

VI. ELECTIONS

22. The parliamentary and local elections, which were initially scheduled to take place on 4 and 25 June 1995, will face a number of technical challenges. All 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 18 of 27 seats in the Senate and approximately 2,200 state and local seats will be contested. A strong political will by all participants in the electoral process, led by the Provisional Electoral Council, will be required to meet these challenges. The registration of candidates will test the determination of the political parties to take part in the race. It is hoped that the registration of voters, which had a slow start, will accelerate to reach 1990 levels. The existence of a secure environment remains a major precondition for a free and fair electoral campaign and a reasonable turnout of voters on election day.

23. President Aristide told me on 30 March that he plans to continue his meetings with the leaders of political parties and members of the Provisional Electoral Council. At the last such meeting, on 6 April 1995, which President Aristide arranged and attended, it was announced that the elections would now take place on 25 June, with the second round on 16 July. Although unfortunate, this postponement is not a major setback. For one thing, it will give the Provisional Electoral Council more breathing space, since its members were working on a very tight schedule. More importantly, the decision to postpone the elections is a goodwill gesture by the Council to the political parties. Dialogue between the Council and the parties, as well as amongst the parties themselves, should now continue with a view to achieving the political consensus needed to enhance the benefits and the credibility of the electoral process.

24. Further to a request by the Government of Haiti, the United Nations is providing technical assistance on electoral matters. A 17-person Electoral Assistance Team is currently active throughout the country at the departmental level, helping the Provisional Electoral Council to set up an adequate infrastructure to carry out the plan for the registration of voters and candidates. Recently, the Electoral Assistance Team participated actively in the transportation of registration material down to the commune level. The multinational force and UNMIH assisted in this operation.

25. The International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) will support the election process by monitoring the human rights aspects of the campaign, in

particular the unrestricted exercise of the freedoms of expression and association. It will do this through civic education programmes; observing campaign rallies; promoting a climate of tolerance; monitoring and reporting on the political climate of the campaign and assisting in resolving differences; and investigating allegations of intimidation or violence related to the elections and the electoral campaign. The Organization of American States (OAS) will carry out its responsibility for the observation of the elections through personnel deployed by it in Haiti. These functions will include recruitment and organization of the work of international observers. MICIVIH, UNMIH and other United Nations agencies in Haiti will be asked to support the observation efforts of OAS, both through the participation of some of their officers as volunteer observers and through the provision of logistic support to the extent possible within existing budget provisions. It is hardly necessary to add that the forthcoming elections are essential for the normalization of the situation in Haiti and for the long-term democratic process.

VII. TRANSITION FROM THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

26. The transition from the multinational force to UNMIH took place on 31 March 1995, in full compliance with the timetable envisaged in my report of 17 January 1995 (S/1995/46, paras. 76 and 77).

27. On 7 February 1995, I met with my Special Representative and with the commanders of the military and CIVPOL components of UNMIH to finalize certain issues relevant to the forthcoming transition. On the same day, all three met with representatives of the troop- and CIVPOL-contributing countries and briefed them on the mandate of the Mission, force structure, concepts of operations, rules of engagement and CIVPOL operational guidelines. As mentioned in my report of 17 January 1995, UNMIH will undertake tasks originally entrusted to it by the Security Council in its resolutions 867 (1993) and 940 (1994). The information in paragraphs 64 to 69 of the above-mentioned report concerning the rules of engagement of UNMIH, the structure of its military component and its deployment and concept of operations remains relevant.

28. It became possible to effect the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH on 31 March in an orderly manner based on the following factors:

(a) The work undertaken by the UNMIH advance team in developing the concept of operations, force structure and deployment plans had been thorough. For five months the advance team had conducted air and ground reconnaissance of the country, developed the structure of UNMIH, analysed the threat situation, developed the concept of logistics and communications support, maintained liaison with the headquarters of the multinational force and planned the transition. The advance team members also coordinated the reception and orientation of the contingents that were not already part of the multinational force (Argentina, Canada, Honduras, India, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Suriname) and received and oriented the staff of the Force headquarters as they arrived in late February and in March. The timely decision of the Security Council to increase the strength of the advance team up to 500 personnel to facilitate the planning of UNMIH, to identify the conditions required for the

transition and to prepare the actual deployment of UNMIH produced positive results. The military and police personnel of the advance team managed to conduct thorough on-site planning of the new Mission and to assess its equipment and personnel requirements. The team's administrative staff established the necessary logistical infrastructure;

(b) Prior to the transition, 70 per cent of the military component of UNMIH, including the Quick Reaction Force and Special Forces elements, had been deployed in Haiti under the multinational force. This provided for the required operational continuity;

(c) The conduct of a six-day integrated staff training exercise in early March benefited the military and civilian staff of UNMIH headquarters and helped them to understand the responsibilities, capabilities, limitations and operational concepts of the various components. The training enabled participants to gain the required knowledge of Haiti and to become acquainted with United Nations peace-keeping principles, rules and procedures;

(d) Finally, two tripartite meetings (bringing together the Government of Haiti, the multinational force command and the United Nations) helped to "synchronize watches" before the transition. Frank and open discussions during these meetings clearly established that UNMIH was well prepared for the transition and that there would be no marked decrease in military capabilities following the transfer of command. Questions relating to security, the forthcoming elections, rehabilitation of the justice and penitentiary systems and the revival of the economy were addressed in detail.

29. Numerous other discussions held virtually until 31 March 1995 in Port-au-Prince, Washington and New York between the Government of Haiti, the multinational force, the United Nations Secretariat, the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti and other interested parties helped to assure the smooth transition and deployment of UNMIH. Working groups composed of the Government of Haiti and UNMIH, together with representatives of the United States, continue to discuss matters related to the Haitian police and the justice system. My Special Representative, the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commander hold weekly meetings with President Aristide on all relevant matters. My Special Representative also meets regularly with Prime Minister Michel, the Chief of President Aristide's Cabinet, Mr. Voltaire, and the President of the Provisional Electoral Council.

30. In paragraph 7 of resolution 940 (1994), the Security Council decided that the tasks of the UNMIH advance team, including a group of observers, would expire on the date of termination of the mission of the multinational force. Accordingly, on 31 March 1995, 24 military observers in the team concluded their mission. Fourteen of them have left Haiti and the remaining ten have been incorporated into the general headquarters staff of the military component of UNMIH.

31. In compliance with usual practice, negotiations were held with the Government of Haiti to ensure that UNMIH will enjoy full freedom of movement and communication, as well as other rights necessary for the performance of its tasks. These negotiations concluded successfully, and on 15 March my Special

Representative and the Minister For Foreign Affairs of Haiti signed a status-of-forces agreement for UNMIH.

VIII. DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

A. Headquarters

32. The Mission has established its headquarters in Port-au-Prince and sub-headquarters in six operational sectors (Cap Haïtien, Gonaïves, Port-au-Prince (2), Jacmel and Les Cayes). Five infantry battalions (including the Quick Reaction Force), support units, a military police battalion, an engineering unit, aviation and logistic elements, a military information support team and a civil affairs unit are deployed in 10 locations (Cap Haïtien, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, Gonaïves, Port-de-Paix, St. Marc, Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, Les Cayes, Jérémie). Special Forces elements are deployed throughout the country in 25 locations. As at 31 March 1995, the Mission had 122 out of 220 international civilian staff, 175 out of 240 local staff and 12 out of 29 United Nations Volunteers. Approximately two thirds of the military and one third of the civilian police components of UNMIH have come from the multinational force.

B. Military components

33. On 31 March 1995, military contingents from Bangladesh (a battalion of 1,050), the CARICOM countries (a battalion of 277), Guatemala (a company of 120), Nepal (a battalion of 410) and the United States (a force of 2,336) were transferred from the multinational force to UNMIH. The total strength of the military contingents of UNMIH transferred from the multinational force is 4,193.

34. Beginning on 15 March 1995, military contingents from Canada (various units totalling 484), Honduras (a company of 117), India (a military police company of 120), the Netherlands (a company of 142) and Pakistan (a battalion of 850) arrived in the Mission area. The total strength of these newly arrived contingents is 1,713. Still scheduled to arrive are contingents from Argentina (15) and Suriname (36).

C. Civilian police

35. The CIVPOL advance team had begun deployment on 27 December 1994 throughout the country. Small teams were sent to Jérémie, Les Cayes, Cap Haïtien, Gonaïves and Jacmel. Preparations were made to identify and secure office accommodations, make contacts with the communities, establish liaison with the multinational force and meet with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. In February, additional personnel were deployed to these locations and those where early transition was to occur. On 14 March 1995, an early transition from the international police monitors to the CIVPOL component of UNMIH started in five locations: Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Gonaïves, Les Cayes and Jérémie. The main difficulty has been the deployment of CIVPOL contingents, owing to changes in the schedule of arrivals

from the contributing countries, the shortage of vehicles and delays in establishing the communications system.

36. Prior to the 31 March transition, 379 police personnel from Argentina (64), Bangladesh (85), Benin (34), Jordan (146) and the Philippines (50) were transferred from international police monitors deployed with the multinational force to the CIVPOL component of UNMIH. Beginning on 15 March, CIVPOL personnel from Algeria, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saint Kitts, Suriname and Togo arrived in Haiti, bringing the strength of the CIVPOL component to 791.

37. Additional CIVPOL personnel from Argentina (38), Dominica (5), France (25), Grenada (10), Nepal (12), Pakistan (4) and Saint Lucia (9) are expected to arrive in the course of April, bringing the strength of UNMIH CIVPOL to the authorized level.

D. Camps

38. With respect to camp construction, the priority until 31 March 1995 was to survey, locate and enter into contractual status all property and land required for Mission headquarters, MICIVIH and CIVPOL regional offices and military campsites.

39. Alteration work on the main headquarters was completed by mid-March, which enabled the principal civilian and military staff to move to their permanent location before the transition. The CIVPOL metropolitan office building in Port-au-Prince is fully operational. CIVPOL plans to have offices in 15 locations throughout the country.

40. Four military camps constructed by the multinational force in Port-au-Prince were taken over on 31 March 1995. Cap Haïtien has three camps built by the multinational force, two of which were taken over on 1 April 1995. There will be a further eight camps throughout the country. They will be constructed by the engineering battalion of UNMIH and should be completed by 20 June 1995.

E. Deployment and operations

41. At the beginning of the operation, the military component of UNMIH plans to accomplish its mission by positioning conventional forces in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, Jacmel and Gonaïves and by stationing Special Forces units throughout the country, as had been done by the multinational force. UNMIH will then gradually expand its presence in each of the operational zones by deploying conventional forces to base camps that will be constructed throughout the country and by actively patrolling from the base camps to ensure that the local governmental, social, and economic institutions can operate unhindered. By providing such an environment, UNMIH will help ensure the security necessary for free and fair elections. The military component will work closely with CIVPOL, the local Haitian authorities and population, the Interim Public Security Force, the new permanent National Police Force, the media, United Nations agencies and

others to coordinate efforts and assist the Government of Haiti in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. Throughout its mission, UNMIH will employ public information personnel, military information support teams and civil affairs resources to their fullest advantage.

42. Coordination between the military and CIVPOL components of UNMIH has been excellent, especially since the two components moved to the new headquarters building, where they have been able to co-locate their operations centres and where the two commanders concerned have their offices. Daily briefings enable the military personnel to benefit from information gathered by the CIVPOL officers deployed throughout Haiti. In the brief time since the transition from the multinational force, these arrangements have already proven to be of high value.

43. As agreed by the Commanders of CIVPOL and the military component in February, a joint Criminal Information Analysis Team was established on 31 March. The members of the team work together in collecting criminal information from the various reports coming from the field, analysing crime trends, developing threat assessments and providing forecasts.

44. The CIVPOL component of UNMIH is also working in coordination with the Department of Investigation and Research of MICIVIH. In view of its familiarity with the political and social environment in Haiti, MICIVIH is providing information and orientation concerning the human rights situation.

45. Among the difficulties which the CIVPOL component has encountered is the fact that the number of interpreters it can employ is limited by budgetary factors. This restriction may affect its operations since several large contingents, which are to provide on-the-job training to French and Creole-speaking personnel, have very little competence in French. The training package to be used is also in French.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

46. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/239 of 31 March 1995, decided to appropriate to the Special Account a total amount of $151,545,100 gross ($149,579,700 net) for the operation of the Mission for the period from 1 February to 31 July 1995, inclusive of the amount of $3,720,700 gross ($3,409,600 net) authorized by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the period from 1 to 28 February 1995 under the terms of Assembly resolution 48/229.

47. With regard to the period beyond 31 July 1995, I have been authorized, on a provisional basis, to enter into commitments at a monthly rate not to exceed $21,202,240 gross ($20,840,040 net) for the three-month period from 1 August to 31 October 1995 in connection with the maintenance of the Mission.

X. OBSERVATIONS

48. The transfer of responsibilities from the multinational force to UNMIH on 31 March 1995 was a milestone in the overall efforts of the international community to bring peace and stability to Haiti. The success achieved by the multinational force in the restoration of the legitimate Government of Haiti and the careful, detailed planning for the assumption of responsibilities by UNMIH give reason to hope that this United Nations operation, notwithstanding the broader scope of its mandate, will be successful. To achieve its goals, it will need the full cooperation of the Government of Haiti. Much depends, in this regard, on the people of Haiti and their leaders. They know that work, determination and patience are needed to rehabilitate their nation's institutions and economy.

49. The state of the Haitian economy is, of course, immensely important. It will be a critical test of the success - or otherwise - of the whole process which is now unfolding. Although economic development is not part of the mandate of UNMIH, the Mission will, where possible, assist in the implementation of development activities. In this context, Mr. Cristián Ossa has been appointed Deputy Special Representative and concurrently Resident Representative for the United Nations Development Programme. This is the first time that the United Nations has linked a peace-keeping mission to development activities in this manner. It will promote closer cooperation between all concerned and will facilitate the transition from UNMIH to continuing peace-building activities by the United Nations in accordance with the established procedures for the coordination of operational activities for development.

50. In accordance with the mandate established in resolution 940 (1994), a fully deployed UNMIH will be able to provide the assistance the Haitian authorities require to carry out their tasks, particularly during the election campaign. In this regard, the establishment of the new Haitian police and the rehabilitation of the judicial system remain crucial both for maintenance of a secure environment and for the consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights and an end to impunity.

51. I should like to stress that UNMIH has signalled to those who might be tempted to try to prevent the Mission from accomplishing its mandate that it will react swiftly and firmly to any attempt to foment instability. The departure of the multinational force and lower UNMIH troop levels should not be perceived by such elements as an opportunity to resume their previous activities.

52. In this context, it must be noted that hostility to the presence of a foreign military force is sometimes expressed in Haiti. However, there is no evidence of any immediate threat to the international presence or to the Government of Haiti. The assertive policy of UNMIH is intended to discourage anyone inclined to cause trouble. The Mission will also continue to provide security for humanitarian relief convoys.

53. Last but not least, I would like to repeat the call I made in Port-au-Prince for everyone in Haiti to help UNMIH help the Haitian people. I would like to tell them again that the international community has the resolve

to help Haiti move forward towards peace, national reconciliation and economic recovery. UNMIH, for its part, has the means and the determination to carry out its mission, which is to help the Government provide security and create the conditions that will allow it to maintain law and order without external support.

54. I would like to remind the political leaders and the people of Haiti that security is not assured by the gun alone. Security requires dialogue, tolerance, cooperation and reconciliation; it needs a national political consensus. Elections should be seen as a step to achieve that consensus. Successful elections will create stable institutions, and stable institutions will enhance security. And finally, stable institutions and enhanced security will allow economic and social development in a country that has been plagued by poverty, unrest and violence.

55. In concluding this first report on UNMIH, I should like to commend my Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, for his willing acceptance of his complex responsibilities. I am certain that with the able assistance of the Force Commander, General J. Kinzer, the CIVPOL Commander, Chief Superintendent N. Pouliot, and the dedicated men and women in the civilian, police and military components of the Mission, he will succeed in guiding it to the attainment of its goals.

Annex I

Composition and strength of the military component of the United Nations Mission in Haiti as at 10 April 1995

	Military contingents	Force headquarters	
Antigua and Barbuda	15	1	
Bangladesh	1 050	22	
Bahamas	36	1	
Barbados	24	-	
Canada	474	26	
Djibouti	-	7	
France	-	2	
Guatemala	120	4	
Guyana	51	-	
Honduras	117	3	
India	120	3	
Ireland	-	2	
Jamaica	101	2	
Nepal	410	4	
Netherlands	142	4	
Pakistan	850	18	
Trinidad and Tobago	55	1	
United States of America	2 290	62	
Total	5 855	162	
Grand total			6 017

Annex II

Composition and strength of the civilian police component of the United Nations Mission in Haiti as at 10 April 1995

Algeria	15
Argentina	63
Austria	20
Bangladesh	85
Barbados	10
Benin	35
Canada	100
Djibouti	15
France	70
Guinea-Bissau	20
Jordan	146
Mali	25
Nepal	41
Pakistan	48
Philippines	50
Russian Federation	5
Saint Kitts	8
Suriname	15
Togo	20
Total	791



Map No. 3888 UNITED NATIONS
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Cartographic Section

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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17 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA, CANADA, FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND VENEZUELA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Friends of the Secretary-General on the question of Haiti have the honour to request that the text of the attached statement be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Emilio J. CARDENAS
Permanent Representative of
Argentina to the United Nations

(Signed) Robert R. FOWLER
Permanent Representative of
Canada to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations

(Signed) Enrique TEJERA-PARIS
Permanent Representative of
Venezuela to the United Nations

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT
Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations

95-10871 (E) 170495 180495

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Annex

[Original: English/French]

Statement of the Friends of the Secretary-General on the question of Haiti

The Friends of the Secretary-General on the question of Haiti welcome the transition on 31 March 1995 from the Multinational Force in Haiti to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), as provided for in Security Council resolution 940 (1994). The Friends congratulate those Member States that participated in the multinational force for the performance of their personnel in establishing a secure and stable environment in Haiti.

Much has been accomplished since the return to office of the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, on 15 October 1994. A new prime minister and a constitutional government have assumed their proper functions. Efforts are under way to reform the justice system, to develop an effective civil administration and to establish a new permanent police force, trained to respect human rights and the rule of law. As called for in resolution 940 (1994), the Government of Haiti has taken practical steps to organize free and fair legislative elections. The Friends note with satisfaction the role of the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) and UNMIH in assisting the Haitian authorities with the electoral process.

However, much remains to be done to build on these positive achievements. The security situation in Haiti remains a matter of concern. While UNMIH's presence will assist the Government of Haiti to sustain a secure and stable environment, the early deployment of a permanent and effective police force and the reactivation of a functioning and fair justice system by the Haitian authorities are central to Haiti's long-term stability. In this regard, the Friends join the Secretary-General's call of 23 March for Member States to contribute to the creation of an adequate police force in Haiti and to the international police monitoring programme.

Continued engagement and commitment by all Haitian parties to the successful organization of free, fair and peaceful legislative and local elections in June, a crucial step in consolidating democracy, is another key priority. Finally, national reconstruction and reconciliation efforts need to be intensified, to reduce the potential for violence and uncertainty.

The Government and people of Haiti bear the main responsibility for these efforts, which are of fundamental importance to Haiti's political, economic and social reconstruction. The Friends underline their firm support for President Aristide and the Government of Haiti for the progress already made and for ongoing efforts to this end. However, the Friends strongly underline the importance of immediate and sustained international assistance in supporting the Haitian people through international financial institutions and bilateral and multilateral programmes. Ongoing political engagement is also critical. The sustained commitment of the international community is indispensable to the prospects for long-term peace and stability in Haiti.

The Friends express their confidence that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNMIH and MICIVIH will continue to assist the Government and people of Haiti to fulfil these objectives. The Friends reaffirm their determination to support the Secretary-General in these efforts, and look forward to his report on the deployment of UNMIH.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the text of a statement by His Excellency Mr. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, concerning the recent campaign of the United States Government against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be appreciated if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-11237 (E) 190495 200495

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Annex

Statement by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the recent desperate campaign of the United States Government against the Islamic Republic of Iran

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The irrational and desperate diplomatic gestures which have recently been adopted by the United States Government towards the Islamic Republic of Iran are the results of a fundamental mistake made by the United States Government when the Islamic revolution achieved victory in 1979 - a mistake which has continued ever since. The truth is that the United States Government failed to understand the nature and the dimensions of the Islamic revolution in Iran, hence through inappropriate postures laid the foundation for a confrontation between the United States and a great divine revolution and even the entire Muslim world, a revolution which accomplished a great victory with invaluable unity among Iranian people and in the light of their massive support attracted the backing of millions of Muslims and oppressed people all around the world, notwithstanding the dominance of a dictatorial regime in Iran at that time and despite the huge support it received from imperialists and Zionists. With these valuable assets, numerous obstacles and conspiracies during the revolutionary period were successfully overcome. The following eight years of sacred and single-handed defence in the face of vast military aggression by the Iraqi regime, backed by Western and Eastern as well as wealthy oil-rich countries and intensive biased coverage by Western news agencies, proved to be yet another success. Finally, the Islamic Republic of Iran established the veracity of its position in the United Nations, which lacked a record of fair dealing with the Islamic revolution, and today it is pursuing its reconstruction and development plans with great success.

The expectation was that the so-called "democratic" administration of the United States in 1979 would demonstrate its comprehension of the Islamic revolution, at least by refraining from creating hindrance and by expressing its regret for the actions by the United States Government in the past. Regrettably, however, meddling and reckless trouble-making by the United States, which are reminders of the colonialist arrogant behaviour of the past, have continued unabated. Instead of attempting to rectify previous mistakes, American officials embarked on a series of irrational actions, including the confiscation and blocking of Iranian assets in the United States, the severance of relationship, the failed aggression on Iran's territory in Tabas, orchestrating military coups, recruiting local terrorists and saboteurs, provoking the Iraqi regime to invade Iran, and initiating a massive wave of mischievous propaganda against the Islamic revolution in Iran in order to mislead public opinion. They even dared to speak of drying out the roots of the grand Iranian nation with its age-old civilization.

Apparently, recurrent failures in implementing these policies have augmented the United States Government's fury rather than making it revise its policies. As a result, it continues to behave immaturely by charging Iran with baseless accusations, thereby enlarging the scope of its illegal and

unsuccessful campaign. Accusations, such as producing and stockpiling chemical weapons and trying to develop nuclear weapons and building up conventional arms, are concocted apparently in order to frighten Iran's neighbours, justify an illegitimate foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf, and impose a costly and unnecessary arms sale to the countries of the region.

Allegations currently propagated by the United States are so obviously baseless that they can hardly even convince those who advance them. The accusation of producing chemical weapons is being made against Iran, which in eight years of defence against Iraq's large-scale use of chemical weapons and its many other violations including brutal attacks against residential areas and civilian aircraft, always observed humanitarian principles and refrained from retaliation in kind. The accusation that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons is equally groundless. As has been repeatedly verified by the observers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has fulfilled all its international commitments with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, whereas numerous terrorist attacks have been inflicted on the Islamic revolution by criminals who freely continue their activities in the United States, Iran is being accused of supporting terrorism. Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran represents a revolution initiated and continued by the will of people and which, unlike other contemporary revolutions, established, immediately after its victory, an administration based on popular referenda and elections, Iran is being charged with dictatorship and violations of human rights. Needless to say that these allegations are mainly propagated by a Government which has been the primary supporter and sponsor of Israel's State-sponsored terrorism, of its aggressive policies, and of its production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and has also backed despotic Governments which have not experienced parliamentarianism, consultation and elections in their political life even for a single day.

It is unclear how much credence the American officials accord to the wisdom of people throughout the world when they seek to present their aggressive push to sell weapons to others as a service to peace, democracy and human rights, or when they seek to preserve their illegitimate and colonial interests in the region by portraying the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has since its inception but followed a policy of good neighbourly relations and forbearance vis-à-vis its neighbours, as a threat or an obstruction.

It may not be far from reality to think that, as a consequence of the American campaign of misinformation, which has regrettably misled a considerable portion of American public opinion concerning this region and Iran, American officials have sunk in a self-made quagmire, and in order to rescue themselves from it they repeatedly adopt erroneous decisions which in themselves render their task increasingly more difficult. Or perhaps partisan politics is at work and the rival party has set a dangerous trap for the current administration as a bridge for victory emanating from the Congress, which is their new stronghold. Whatever the reason for the current provocations, American policy makers need to revisit their misconceptions, misdeeds, and their historic errors.

Undoubtedly, the announcement of a prohibition of trade on the part of the United States with a large country like Iran, with vast natural resources,

significant potential and a large foreign relations network, cannot be considered a consequential event for the economy of the country.

Continuation of some commercial trade may have deceived them, but a little reflection makes it abundantly clear that this cooperation was not out of urgency but could have other reasons. A case in point is the disclosure of the American dual policy, which reserves for itself the prerogative to engage in commercial trade with Iran while disallowing others to do the same. It seeks to put pressure on its competitors, though in a clumsy fashion, to discontinue their trade with Iran and, contrary to all principles and norms, expects them to forgo their respective legitimate interests and profits. It appears as if American officials are unwilling to accept the primarily exclusive arms market and lucrative projects in other oil-rich countries of the region along with losing the Iranian market as a package. Indeed, it is these dual policies which erode any confidence in the United States in the long term.

It is another big mistake if American officials view pressuring Iran as a means of achieving their objectives in imposing an unjust peace on Palestinian people. They should seek the reasons for the failure of such a scheme in the unfair provisions of the accord, which is silent on the root causes of the problem. For instance, no solution is offered to relieve millions of Palestinian refugees; their strong national, Islamic and human sentiments, which have been savagely suppressed for half a century, have not been positively addressed; their unforgettable dream of returning to their homeland and the exercise of their inalienable rights have been neglected; decades of jihad and struggle, and suffering their loss of thousands of lives and other essential questions of this sort, have remained unanswered in the accord.

If a mere expression of opposition to the process on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran is so effective that even in the absence of any practical measure it can paralyse the process which enjoys the full support of big and small Powers, would it not be appropriate to revise the nature of behaviour towards this source of influence and strength?

The formulators of the recent American provocations should realize that their recent adventurism, like their irrational policies of the last 16 years vis-à-vis Iran, will bear no fruit for the United States. Under such circumstances, in the light of the economic problems in the United States and considering the prevailing situation in the international market, the greatest loss will be directed at the economic interests of that country. Fully aware of the power of Islam and Iran, as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran I underline the reality that today Iran, relying on its potential, human resources, a devoted, politically aware and active public, a stable system and a geo-strategic location, is no place for new American adventurism. Iran can easily terminate the existing economic relations whenever it deems appropriate, while continuing its reconstruction programme full force. Such illegal and irrational acts of provocation by the United States Government can only lead to regional instability and disruption in a healthy international political and economic relation.

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LETTER DATED 14 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the message dated 13 April 1995 from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ravan FARHADI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-11159 (E) 170495 180495

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Annex

Letter dated 13 April 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan addressed to the Secretary-General

The recent heavy artillery attacks and bombardments on Afghan soil by the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, more specifically of the Russian Federation, caused deep distress among the Government and the people of Afghanistan. It is with great regret that I have to draw your special attention to these recent events.

Following repeated incursions into and bombing of the territory of Afghanistan, beginning on 9 April 1995 and continuing on 10 and 11 April, by the Air Force of the Russian Federation stationed in Tajikistan, on 12 April 1995, at 2.50 a.m. local time, jets of the Russian Federation Air Force bombarded the Darwaz, Baharak and Yaftal districts in Badakhshan Province and the Chah-é-Ab and Farkhar districts in Takhar Province, causing heavy casualties among the civilian population of the region.

On the morning of 13 April, at 6.30 a.m. local time, 12 jets of the Russian Federation Air Force brutally bombarded Taleqan City, causing 50 deaths among the civilian population - as far as is known to date - and wounded more than 100 persons. The search for the victims' bodies under the debris is still continuing. At the headquarters of the police force in Takhar, all logistical and security offices were destroyed. This bombardment, in which napalm and cluster bombs were used, was so severe and extensive that more than 100 shops of the bazaar of the capital of Takhar Province, as well as a floor and a cereal market, were completely demolished. Approximately 280 head of cattle were killed and heavy damage was inflicted on the civilian population.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan firmly believes that these attacks are blatant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of accepted principles of international law.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, which has repeatedly protested to the Russian Federation and to Tajikistan in the past, is once again reiterating its strong protest against these attacks and bombardments.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan sincerely declares that Afghanistan's attitude towards Tajik refugees is only characterized by humanitarian intentions. It is a moral obligation for the Afghans to spare no effort in providing humanitarian assistance to the Tajik refugees, with whom Afghans have historical, cultural, linguistic and religious ties.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan declares once again that the delay in the voluntary repatriation to Tajikistan of the Tajik refugees now in northern Afghanistan is attributable to their lack of confidence about their security in their own country. Past experience has proved to them that their life could subsequently be in danger if they agree to be repatriated under current circumstances.

The military events inside the borders of Tajikistan are an internal problem of that country.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan strictly respects the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and is observing this principle particularly in its relations with its neighbours.

We sincerely wish that peace and security will prevail in Tajikistan. We wish our frontier with Tajikistan to be a frontier of friendship, brotherhood and good-neighbourliness.

At this stage, when Afghan soil is under the heavy bombardment of the Russian Air Force, we urgently expect H.E. Ambassador Ramiro Píriz-Ballón, your Special Envoy for Tajikistan, who is now engaged in shuttle diplomacy in the region, to visit Kabul.

(Signed) Najibullah LAFRAIE
Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs

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Security Council

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17 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the time that Security Council resolutions 943 (1994) and 970 (1995) were adopted, two competing expectations prevailed. Most of us hoped that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had finally begun to reverse the disastrous course of direct aggression in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and had decisively opted for peace. On the other hand, most of us also expressed the concern that the Belgrade regime was not acting sincerely with the Council, but was engaged in a tactical manoeuvre designed to secure an easing of sanctions without a definitive turn away from its disastrous policies.

Unfortunately, it appears that our concerns were justified and our hopes, once again, have been dashed.

First, the border between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is not just porous with violations, but has the characteristic of a series of flash-floods of strategic goods ravaging our country. Helicopter flights, bus loads of soldiers and fuel transports are all evidence of this untenable situation. We would like to express here our appreciation to the delegation of the United States of America for having brought these facts to the attention of the Security Council and for reflecting ongoing concerns with the mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, including failure to address compliance with resolution 970 (1995) and circumvention of the border closure through the Republic of Croatia. This straightforward approach by the United States delegation leaves some hope that the border mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia could be buttressed and injected with credibility, rather than the border monitoring mission becoming a rubber stamp and alibi for the Belgrade regime. It is clear that the border monitoring mission, as currently structured, is not adequate for the task regardless of the integrity or commitment of those who serve.

Second, unfortunately, the flaws in the border monitoring mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the violations of the border are not the only basis for our scepticism with regard to Belgrade's

commitment to peace. After numerous chances, offered through the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), for mutual recognition with its neighbours, including the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Belgrade regime has stubbornly refused, holding on to its perverse ambitions. For a regime that has initiated and coordinated the war and ethnic cleansing against our Republic (I call your attention here to the New York Times article of 13 April 1995, citing internal documents of the Serbian secret police as evidence of Belgrade's promotion of acts that constitute violations of humanitarian law and of the Genocide Convention, and which constitute aggression), formal recognition is the minimal step to be expected. That step has not been taken and, in fact, the evidence is that Belgrade believes that it now can dictate the road to a political solution consistent with its illegal ambitions.

We were among those that had hoped for a definite turn towards peace from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), but it has not happened. For the above-mentioned reasons, we cannot support the extension of the current regime of easing sanctions with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). When the Belgrade regime has made the sincere turn for peace and the border is no longer violated, we shall be prepared to endorse to the Council the reciprocal reward. Our Republic's territorial integrity and sovereignty is too jeopardized and the Council's authority and integrity is too precious for less.

May I ask for your kind assistance in distributing the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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18 April 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement by the Rwandese Government on refugees dated 6 April 1995.

This statement demonstrates the good will of the Rwandese Government in encouraging the return of the refugees.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Manzi BAKURAMUTSA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Rwanda to the United Nations

95-11301 (E) 180495 180495 190495

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Annex

Statement by the Rwandese Government on refugees dated 6 April 1995

The war, the massacres and the genocide which plunged Rwanda into mourning, especially during the period from April to July 1994, gave rise to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and caused millions of refugees to flee beyond our frontiers.

These, regrettably, were in addition to more than 1 million former Rwandese refugees which the turbulent history of our country had forced to flee and to remain in exile.

Immediately after the war, the genocide and the massacres, the total number of refugees - both former and new refugees - as well as internally displaced persons had been estimated at about 3.5 million, or the equivalent of 50 per cent of the population of this country before April 1994.

On 19 July 1994 a government of national unity, incorporating all the political parties which were not involved in the massacres and the genocide, was formed. It immediately undertook a broad awareness campaign aimed at the return of the displaced persons and refugees.

The Rwandese Government considers that the return of the refugees - both former and new - is an inalienable right and constitutes a factor for peace, unity and national reconciliation.

Currently, about 1.2 million refugees, 50 per cent of whom are new refugees, have returned. Nevertheless, Rwanda estimates that there are still more than 2 million persons in exile and about 300,000 internally displaced persons.

Despite the appeal repeatedly made by the central authorities of the country, the agents of these crimes against humanity continue to engage in acts of intimidation against the Rwandese refugees who wish to return to their country. They clearly want to keep them hostage and utilize them in an attempt to escape justice.

The Rwandese Government considers that the return of the Rwandese refugees remains one of its priorities. It has therefore decided on a number of actions, including the following:

1. Continuation of contacts with responsible officials in the countries in which our compatriots took refuge in order to facilitate their return.

In this context, the Government has negotiated and concluded tripartite agreements with the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and the countries which are sheltering the refugees. Such agreements already exist with Zaire and Burundi. Contacts are currently in progress with the United Republic of Tanzania with a view to the signing of a similar agreement.

2. A request to the host countries to segregate innocent persons from those responsible for genocide and massacres.

The people who are free from any wrongdoing wish to return to their country. Their segregation from the criminals would greatly facilitate the speedy return to Rwanda of hundreds of thousands of innocent people currently being held hostage by the criminals.

3. Continuation of the policy of promoting awareness both within and beyond our frontiers concerning the need for the return of the refugees.

A campaign for reception and national reconciliation is being conducted by the authorities and the government mass media in order to support and facilitate the return of the refugees.

4. Promotion of the return of the refugees. The Rwandese Government has set up an interministerial commission entrusted with settling lawsuits over properties which were abandoned by the refugees and temporarily occupied by other persons. The Rwandese Government reaffirms the constitutional right to private property.

It is moreover the responsibility of the Government to find sites where refugees who have nowhere to go can settle and also to help them in resettlement and reintegration into society with the assistance of the international community.

5. Identification of sites for resettlement and areas for the settlement of former refugees.

The Rwandese Government has already defined several resettlement sites both in the countryside and in towns in order to receive the refugees. Instructions have been issued for finding other resettlement sites.

6. Integration of the members of the former government forces.

The first elements of the Rwandese armed forces who broke ranks with their colleagues and who are not guilty of massacres and genocide have received ad hoc training and have been reintegrated into the national army.

7. Pursuit of operations for assistance to the displaced persons and to the refugees once they have been repatriated or in connection with their property.

These provisions have been supplemented by the setting up of the commission for repatriation of the refugees provided for in the Arusha Peace Agreement and the establishment of a unit for coordination of humanitarian assistance attached to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, and by the gradual strengthening of security conditions, which will, inter alia, take the form of:

- Acceleration of the process of setting up the local administration;

- The deployment of international human-rights observers in the field;

- Reorganization of the judicial system;

- Eradication of any temptation to take personal revenge;

- Respect for procedures concerning the arrest and detention of those suspected of involvement in the genocide and the massacres;

- The effective establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and genocide committed in Rwanda;

- The speedy and equitable trial of those responsible for the genocide and the massacres.

The Rwandese Government also intends to set up, with the support of the international community, centres for the reception and transit of refugees who return to Rwanda with a view to inspiring their self-confidence, caring for and identifying them, and subsequently organizing transport and assistance in terms of food, building materials and agricultural inputs.

These transit centres will comprise a service for the registration of persons repatriated and of their property, a service for the distribution of humanitarian assistance, an orientation service to determine sites for resettlement of those repatriated who do not possess land and the regions from which the new refugees originated. Transit through these centres will have to be brief, with a maximum stay of one week.

The refugees who require resettlement will pass through a reception centre situated near their resettlement site.

This centre will serve as a place for registration, distribution of food aid, medicines and building materials until such time as each family can complete the building of its dwelling on a parcel of land allocated to it by the Administration.

The Rwandese Government would like to urge the neighbouring countries which are sheltering refugees and also the international community to take note of the following:

1. Innocent persons in the camps should be segregated from criminals guilty of massacres and genocide in order to enable the former to return to Rwanda;

2. Refugees who do not wish to return to the country should be kept at a distance from the frontiers of Rwanda;

3. There should be collaboration with the Rwandese tribunals and the International Criminal Tribunal in the arrest and transfer of those guilty of the massacres and genocide, wherever they may be;

4. Humanitarian, technical and financial assistance in behalf of Rwandese refugees should be continued.

In this regard, the Rwandese Government welcomes the success of the consolidated appeal launched on 20 January 1995 in Geneva for the benefit of Rwandese refugees at the initiative of the United Nations system.

The Rwandese Government, as it has constantly been doing, once again launches a solemn appeal to all Rwandese refugees to return to their motherland with a view to participating in the reconstruction of the country.

It is inadmissible that Rwandese should be forced to leave the country which had sheltered them in order to take refuge once again in another neighbouring country rather than to re-enter Rwanda. This is with particular reference to those Rwandese citizens who have been held up in recent days at the frontier between Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania.

The Rwandese Government takes this opportunity to reiterate its gratitude to the countries which are sheltering its refugees and to the international community, especially the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, while at the same time urging them to pursue this humanitarian action with a view to enabling the Rwandese refugees to return, resettling them and contributing to their social and economic reintegration.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/311
18 April 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

France: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and reaffirming in this context its resolution 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995 and in particular its paragraphs 6 and 7,

Expressing its grave concern at the continued fighting in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina despite the agreements on a cease-fire and on the complete cessation of hostilities concluded on 23 and 31 December 1994 (S/1995/8), and deploring the violations of these agreements and of the ban imposed by its resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993 by whomsoever committed,

Stressing the unacceptability of all attempts to resolve the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by military means,

Noting once again the need for resumed negotiations aimed at an overall peaceful settlement of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting-point,

Gravely preoccupied at the recent attacks on the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the fatalities resulting therefrom, condemning in the strongest terms such unacceptable acts directed at members of peace-keeping forces and determined to obtain a strict respect of the status of United Nations personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Emphasizes once again the responsibility of the parties and others concerned in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the security and safety of UNPROFOR and, in this context, demands again that all parties and others concerned refrain from any act of intimidation or violence against UNPROFOR and its personnel;

2. Recalls its invitation to the Secretary-General, in this context, to submit proposals on any measures which could be taken to prevent attacks against UNPROFOR and its personnel and allow it to perform effectively its mission, and invites him to submit such proposals on an urgent basis;

3. Calls upon the Bosnian parties to agree to an extension of the agreements on a cease-fire and complete cessation of hostilities concluded on 23 and 31 December 1994 beyond 30 April 1995 and looks to all parties and all others concerned to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in their implementation;

4. Urges all parties and others concerned to resume forthwith negotiations towards an overall peaceful settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting-point;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/50/159
S/1995/312
18 April 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC/ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Items 42, 44, 84 and 85 of the
preliminary list*
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 18 April 1995 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Enclosed please find a letter, dated 14 April 1995, addressed to you and the President of the Security Council by Mr. Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Foreign Minister of Palestine.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and of the enclosed letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under items 42, 44, 84 and 85 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasser AL-KIDWA
Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations

* A/50/50.

ANNEX

Letter dated 14 April 1995 from the Head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

The situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, including the city of Jerusalem, has been steadily deteriorating since 1967 as a result of the failure of the occupying Power, the Government of Israel, to comply with its legal responsibilities in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law, and to implement relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly resolutions 242 (1967), 465 (1980) and 478 (1980).

In resolution 904 (1994), the Security Council affirmed the necessity of an international presence in the occupied territory in order to prevent friction and clashes.

In view of the friction that exists and the bloody events and clashes which have taken place, it has become the duty of the United Nations, in accordance with the purposes of its Charter and customary practice, to intervene quickly in order to put an end to these Israeli policies and practices, and to make Israel implement the Security Council resolutions.

We are extremely concerned at the rise in tension as a result of Israel's continued refusal to meet its obligations to the United Nations, particularly to the Security Council, and its failure to carry out its responsibilities with respect to the maintenance of world peace and security. The situation in Palestine gives rise to the fear that the fuse of bloody conflict in the region is about to be ignited.

I hope that my request will find attentive listeners, who will react to the situation out of concern for peace, security and stability in Palestine and in the Middle East. The first step towards achieving peace will be taken when Israel meets its obligations under resolution 242 (1967), and withdraws from the territories occupied since 1967, as the Security Council has acknowledged in a number of relevant resolutions. The Declaration of Principles, signed in Washington on 13 September 1993, stated that the aim of the agreement was to achieve lasting peace by implementing Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

(Signed) Farouk KADDOUMI
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
State of Palestine
Head of the Political Department of
the Palestine Liberation Organization

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/313
18 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GREECE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On 14 April 1995, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Greece, the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine adopted in Athens a joint statement, the text of which is enclosed herewith, by which they agreed that our Governments would undertake a collective démarche to Your Excellency and the Security Council addressing the issue of the negative impact of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), both on the affected countries and on the region as a whole. This initiative is open to other countries which may wish to join it.

The Ministers authorized Greece to inform Your Excellency and the members of the Security Council of the said initiative. I would therefore kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Christos G. ZACHARAKIS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Joint statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Greece, the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine, adopted at Athens on 14 April 1995

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its serious repercussions are a cause of grave concern.

By virtue of the geographical situation of our countries, the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have caused significant direct and indirect losses to our economies. The burden of the sanctions exceeds the reasonable point of economic and social tolerance.

The affected countries have agreed to undertake a collective démarche to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the United Nations Security Council addressing the issue of the special economic problems as a result of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This initiative is open to other countries which may wish to join it.

Even more, the implementation of the sanctions could have a considerable long-term negative impact on the overall political, economic, security and social situation in the affected third countries and the region as a whole.

The affected countries express their support to the efforts of the international community and especially of the Contact Group for achieving a peaceful, just and lasting political solution to the crisis in parallel with the suspension and lifting of the sanctions.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/314
19 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

It is with great concern and alarm that I have to inform you of yet another in a series of provocations that have come to constitute an extremely serious deterioration of the security situation in the southern part of the Republic of Croatia. In this regard, I should also like to recall the letter from my Foreign Minister to the President of the Security Council of 13 April 1995 (S/1995/301, annex).

Today, at 11.15 a.m. local time, a shell launched from the Serbian-held positions inside the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina impacted in the vicinity of the Dubrovnik Cilipi Airport. At that moment as many as 1,000 persons were attending the opening ceremony at the Cilipi terminal building. Among those attending were many diplomatic representatives accredited to Croatia, as well as the Prime Minister of Croatia, Mr. Nikica Valentić.

Following the incidents described in the aforementioned letter from my Foreign Minister, the Serbian side took the lack of a proper response from the international community as a signal that such terrorist acts would in fact be condoned in the future as well.

Croatia is fully aware that such terrorist acts are carefully timed to occur at the time when the international community is considering new measures to properly implement the existing mandate in Croatia and elsewhere in the region. The aim is to intimidate, as well as to provoke. Croatia has shown extreme restraint in face of these terrorist acts, even when the life of its Prime Minister is threatened, but such restraint cannot be practised endlessly.

The international community must find a proper way to marshall sufficient will and resources to curtail these attacks that not only threaten the peace and security in this part of Croatia but also threaten the welfare and security of diplomatic representatives and other international personnel in Croatia. I should like to reiterate Croatia's position that this issue should be considered under the agenda item proposed by the French delegation in the Security Council concerning the safety and security of international personnel in the region.

May I ask for your kind assistance in distributing the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative